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LIQUOR VENDOR LIABILITY FOR TORTS OF
INTOXICATED PATRONS
An intoxicatedpersonbehind the wheel of an automobile can be
as dangerousas an insaneperson with afirearm. He is as much
a hazard to the safety of the community as a stick of dynamite
that must be de-fused in order to be rendered harmless. To
serve an intoxicatedperson more liquor is to light thefuse.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Personal injury and property damage caused by drunk drivers
continues to rise in alarming proportions in Maryland and across the
nation.2 While state legislatures have enacted provisions aimed at
curbing the increase in injuries and damages, these measures normally
focus upon the intoxicated driver rather than the commercial supplier
of alcoholic beverages. Actions recently taken by the Maryland General Assembly, in imposing stricter penalties on the drunk driver,' are
representative of the typical legislative response to the increase in automobile accidents caused by inebriated motorists. Some states, however,
in enacting dram shop laws, have not ignored the role played by the
commercial purveyor of liquor.
Historically, courts applied a common law standard, in the absence of legislation, that freed tavern owners from civil liability to third
party victims of a drunken tort-feasor's act. However, in response to
the modem rise in drinking-related accidents and the sporadic application of dram shop legislation, judges began to reexamine the common
law rule of vendor nonliability. As a result, a majority of modem jurisdictions find a cause of action to exist against tavern owners. Nevertheless, a minority of courts, including Maryland's, retain the traditional
rule of nonliability despite a sale of liquor by the vendor which either
violates a criminal statute or was made to someone obviously too drunk
to drive.
This comment traces the common law and statutory development
of vendor liability for the tortious acts of patrons. Additionally, the
common law position accepted in Maryland, and recently reaffirmed in
Felder v. Butler,4 is examined in the context of modern developments
1. Jardine v. Upper Darby Lodge No. 1973, Inc., 413 Pa. 626, 629, 198 A.2d 550, 553
(1964).
2. Baltimore Sunpapers, Jan. 10, 1982, at B2, col. 2; see also Md. Dep't of Transp.,
Report of the Task Force on the Drinking Driver 3 (1980) (available from Md.
Dep't of Transp.).
3. See, e.g., Law of May 3, 1982, ch. 98, 1982 Md. Laws 1246 (codified at MD. ANN.
CODE art. 27 §§ 639, 641(a) (1982 & Supp. 1982)) (probation before judgment
prohibited for repeat violations of drunk driving laws); Law of May 5, 1981, ch.
244, 1981 Md. Laws 1439 (codified at MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 16-205.1 (1977
& Supp. 1982) (implied consent to alcohol test deemed for anyone driving Maryland highways).
4. 292 Md. 174, 438 A.2d 494 (1981).
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in vendor liability law and those theories adopted by the majority of
jurisdictions.
II.

BACKGROUND

A.

Common Law Liability

At common law, it was not considered a tort either to sell or to
give intoxicating liquor to a strong and able-bodied man.5 This rule
was premised on the theory that the customer's act of consuming the
liquor, not the vendor's sale, was the proximate cause of resulting third
party injury.6 Consequently, in the absence of a statutory provision to
the contrary, no cause of action against a tavern owner was available to
persons suffering personal or property damage as the result of acts
committed by drunk patrons.7
It was uniformly held by the common law courts that the act of
merely serving liquor to a customer failed to meet the requisite elements for a cause of action in negligence. Once the customer left the
tavern premises, these courts ruled that the bar owner was under no
duty to safeguard the general public from the inebriate's potential misdeeds.' The general rule of nonliability was premised on two alternative theories. The act of selling a drink to a patron was considered too
remote to constitute a direct act of negligence9 due to a reluctance to
charge the tavern owner with foreseeability of the resulting harm. '0 In
the alternative, it was held that the sale did not constitute a proximate
cause of the resulting loss" since the inebriate's acts were perceived to
be an intervening cause of the final harm.' 2
It was also a well settled common law principle that an intoxicated
man was to be held to the same standard of care as an ordinary man for
acts committed while inebriated;' 3 hence the drunk customer alone was
held to bear legal responsibility for any injury caused by his acts. Fur5. Cruse v. Aden, 127 Ill. 231, 20 N.E. 73 (1889); Seibel v. Leach, 233 Wis. 66, 288
N.W. 774 (1939). The protection given tavern owners under the common law rule
extended the "able-bodied man" concept to include women and minors as well.
See, e.g., Collier v. Stamatis, 63 Ariz. 285, 162 P.2d 125 (1945) (no liability imposed for damages caused by serving liquor to a minor female); Fleckner v.
Dionne, 94 Cal. App. 2d 246, 210 P.2d 530 (1949) (no liability imposed for serving
a minor).
6. Nolan v. Morelli, 154 Conn. 432, 436-37, 226 A.2d 383, 386 (1967); Hill v. Alexander, 321 Ill. App. 406, 419, 53 N.E.2d 307, 313 (1944).
7. See Cole v. Rush, 45 Cal. 2d 345, 348, 289 P.2d 450, 452 (1955); Demge v. Feierstein, 22 Wis. 199, 203, 268 N.W. 210, 212 (1936).
8. Padulo v. Schneider, 346 II. App. 454, 457, 105 N.E.2d 115, 116 (1952).
9. Cowman v. Hansen, 250 Iowa 358, 92 N.W.2d 682 (1958).
10. Waller's Adm'r v. Collinsworth, 144 Ky. 3, 137 S.W. 766 (1911).
11. Belding v. Johnson, 86 Ga. 177, 180-81, 12 S.E. 304, 305 (1890); Cowman v. Hansen, 250 Iowa 358, 368-70, 92 N.W.2d 682, 687-88 (1958); Tarwater v. Atlantic
Co., 176 Tenn. 510, 144 S.W.2d 746, 748 (1940).
12. See, e.g., King v. Henkie, 80 Ala. 505, 510 (1886).
13. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 32 (4th ed. 1971).
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thermore, in cases of continued sales to individuals obviously intoxicated, vendor liability was judicially deflected by finding the consumer
still capable of consent, and thus responsible for his own actions.' 4
While limited exceptions existed,' 5 vendors of alcoholic beverages were
generally free from civil liability even in instances of illegal sales.' 6
Courts frequently drew upon additional theories to support the refusal to modify the common law. Judges denied a cause of action on
the ground that courts were unable to grant recovery or authorize actions unknown to the common law.17 Other courts held that judicial
abrogation of the common law would be an inappropriate encroachment upon legislative authority.' 8 Faced with the rigidity of the common law doctrine, state legislatures began confronting the problem and
formulated statutory provisions designed to grant injured parties a
remedy at law against tavern owners.
B.

Statutory Liability

A number of state legislatures enacted dram shop laws (also know
as civil damage acts) to create a cause of action for torts committed by
an intoxicated patron.' 9 Early dram shop legislation found its impetus
in the temperance movement popular in the late 1800's and the early
14. See, e.g., Bissell v. Starzinger, 112 Iowa 266, 271, 83 N.W. 1065, 1067 (1900).
15. Exceptions to the common law rule focused on the concept of the "able-bodied
man" in evaluating the consumer. A few courts, therefore, recognized a cause of
action when the liquor was served to an obviously intoxicated individual lacking
responsibility for his behavior. See, e.g., Hoyt v. Tilton, 81 N.H. 477, 128 A. 688
(1925); Ibach v. Jackson, 148 Or. 92, 35 P.2d 672 (1934); McCue v. Klein, 60 Tex.
168 (1883). Liquor sales to known or habitual drunkards also served as a basis of
departure from the common law rule of nonliability in certain jurisdictions. See,
e.g., Pratt v. Daley, 55 Ariz. 535, 104 P.2d 147 (1940); Swanson v. Ball, 67 S.D.
161, 290 N.W. 482 (1940).
16. Furnishing alcoholic beverages to certain classes of persons has been prohibited
by statute to some degree in all states. Felder v. Butler, 292 Md. 174, 181 n.3, 438
A.2d 494, 498 n.3 (1981); see, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 4, § 904 (1974 & Supp.
1980) (sales to individuals under 20 years of age are prohibited; seller subject to
fine or imprisonment); GA. CODE ANN. § 3-3-22 (1982) (sales to noticeably intoxicated persons are prohibited). Violation of these statutes rarely was sufficient, in
itself, to warrant civil liability imposition upon the vendor in the absence of concurrent civil damage legislation. See, e.g., Fleckner v. Dionne, 94 Cal. App. 2d
246, 210 P.2d 530 (1949); Barboza v. Decas, 311 Mass. 10, 40 N.E.2d 10 (1940);
Hall v. Budagher, 76 N.M. 591, 417 P.2d 71 (1966).
17. Henry Grady Hotel Co. v. Sturgis, 70 Ga. App. 379, 385-86, 28 S.E.2d 329, 333
(1943); Seibel v. Leach, 233 Wis. 66, 68, 288 N.W. 774, 775 (1939).
18. See, e.g., Cole v. Rush, 45 Cal. 2d 345, 354, 289 P.2d 450, 455 (1955).
19. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 11-101 (McKinney 1978); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 4399.1 (Page 1973). The legislative purpose behind these statutes was to
supply a remedy to third parties injured by the tavern owner's sale of liquor to the
tort-feasor. Without such a statutory provision, an innocent victim was without
recourse against the vendor. Hyba v. C. A. Horneman, Inc., 302 Ill. App. 143,
146, 23 N.E.2d 564, 565 (1939); Mead v. Stratton, 87 N.Y. 493, 496-97 (1882);
Healey v. Cady, 104 Vt. 463, 466, 161 A. 151, 152 (1932).
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1900's.2° The underlying legislative purpose was often to embody the
local community's social and moral abhorrance of the ills of alcohol.2 '
More modern legislatures, however, enact dram shop laws under the
power of the State to control and regulate liquor traffic within its borders,2 2 and to provide for the general welfare of its citizenry.2 3 In addition to providing adequate remedies to victims of alcohol-related torts,
the rationale behind modern dram shop laws is to protect members of
the general public and the patron, himself.2 4 Moreover, modern legis-

latures view statutory liability of tavern owners as a risk incident to the

nature of the business.25
The effect of dram shop legislation is to impose a degree of strict
liability upon the bar owner. 26 The common law rule of proximate
cause is statutorily altered to focus upon the vendor's sale, rather than
the consumer's act of drinking the liquor.2 7 Such legislation, therefore,
frees the injured party from the requirement of establishing negligence
or fault on the part of the tavern owner.28 Similarly, the victim is not
faced with overcoming the common law presumption of a lack of foreseeability by the bar owner before civil liability can be imposed.2 9
While dram shop legislation creates a cause of action against vendors which was unavailable at common law, there exist a variety of
limitations that tend to reduce its effectiveness. Much of the utility of
these laws is stifled by restrictions as to the class of plaintiffs30 or the
limited scope of a permitted cause of action.3' Additionally, judicial
interpretation of dram shop laws has produced divergent approaches as
20. See Ogilvie, History andAppraisalof the Illinois Dram Shop Act, 1958 U. ILL. L.F.
175, 176-82, for an interesting and enlightening discussion of the foundations of
dram shop legislation in the United States and the State of Illinois.
21. Id at 177.
22. Klopp v. Benevolent Protective Order of Elks, 309 I11. App. 145, 153, 33 N.E.2d
161, 165-66 (1941).
23. Pierce v. Albanese, 144 Conn. 241, 247-48, 129 A.2d 606, 612-13 (1957).
24. Vance v. United States, 355 F. Supp. 756 (D. Alaska 1973).
25. Klopp v. Benevolent Protective Order of Elks, 309 Ill. App. 145, 153, 33 N.E.2d
161, 165 (1941); Hyba v. C. A. Horneman, Inc., 302 Ill. App. 143, 149, 23 N.E.2d
564, 567 (1939). By selling liquor under a state license, which is a privilege and
not a right, the vendor is judged to have assumed the risk of statutory liability.
See, e.g., Pierce v. Albanese, 144 Conn. 241, 252, 129 A.2d 606, 613 (1957).
26. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 81, at 538 (4th ed. 1971).
27. Healey v. Cady, 104 Vt. 463, 466, 161 A. 151, 152 (1932).
28. See Appleman, Pleading,Evidence, andProcedure Underthe Dram Shop Act, 1958
U. ILL. L.F. 219, 234-45.
29. Id at 236.
30. While most dram shop laws provide a cause of action against the tavern owner by
any person suffering injury or damage caused by a drunk patron, a number of
jurisdictions limit recovery solely to the patron's immediate family. See, e.g.,
Comment, Dram Shop Liability - A JudicialResponse, 57 CAL. L. REV. 995, 997
(1969). Other jurisdictions, though not limiting the imposition of civil liability to
immediate family members, have indicated the specific coverage under the statute. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 340.95 (1972 & Supp. 1982).
31. Certain jurisdictions' dram shop legislation requires family members or employers to provide the tavern owner with written notice of the patron's habitual drunk-
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to their application. Some jurisdictions favor a belief that since dram
shop laws create a remedy unknown at common law they should be
narrowly construed.3 2 Other courts, in an effort to further advance the
policy of allowing injured persons to recover from tavern owners, give
a liberal construction to such legislation.33 Furthermore, the number of
states that employ dram shop laws has fluctuated with the change in
attitudes and perceptions of each newly-elected state legislature.34 Due
to these inherent limitations in existing dram shop legislation, modem
courts again began to reevaluate the common law doctrine in an effort
to conform the law to the needs of today's society.
C. Modern Changes in Vendor Liability Through Case Law
Traditional principles of tavern owner tort liability have undergone a dramatic change over the last twenty-five years. As courts have
reconsidered the issue of third party injury claims against vendors, they
have increasingly abandoned the common law approach. Currently,
an overwhelming majority of courts have rejected the traditional common law rule.3 5 This current trend had its genesis in two landmark
enness and with a request to refuse delivery or sale of alcoholic beverages to the
individual. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-103 (1973).

32. See Howlett v. Dogilo, 402 IlL. 311, 318-20, 83 N.E.2d 708, 712-14 (1949); Kennedy v. Garrigan, 23 S.D. 265, 267, 121 N.W. 783, 785 (1909).
33. See Arlington v. Phelps, 79 F. Supp. 295, 297 (D. IUl. 1948); Wilcox v. Conti, 174
Misc. 230, 231-32, 20 N.Y.S.2d 106, 107 (1940).
34. There are currently sixteen jurisdictions with dram shop laws in effect. ALA.
CODE tit. 6, § 6-5-71 (1977); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-103 (1973); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 30-102 (West 1975); GA. CODE ANN. § 3-3-22 (1982); ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 43, § 135 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982); IOWA CODE ANN. § 123.92 (West
Supp. 1982-83); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 436.22 (1978); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 340.95 (1972 & Supp. 1982); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 11-101 (McKinney 1978);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 5-01-06 (1975); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4399.01 (Page
1973); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 3-11-1, 3-11-2 (1976); UTAH CODE ANN. § 32-11-1
(1981); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 501 (1972); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 176.35 (West Supp.
1980); Wyo. STAT. § 12-5-502 (1977).

The fluctuation in the number of states employing such legislation may be
observed by comparing similar listings in various writings on the topic. Compare
Comment, Dram Shop Liability--A JudicialResponse, 57 CAL. L. REV. 995, 99697 n.6 (1969) with The Torts of the Intoxicated- Who Should Be Liable, 15
COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 33, 34 n.14 (1979).

35. Marusa v. District of Columbia, 484 F.2d 828 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Vance v. United
States, 355 F. Supp. 756 (D. Alaska 1973); Deeds v. United States, 306 F. Supp.
348 (D. Mont. 1969); Davis v. Shiappacosse, 155 So.2d 365 (Fla. 1963); Ono v.
Applegate, 612 P.2d 533 (Hawaii 1980); Alegria v. Payonk, 101 Idaho 617, 619
P.2d 135 (1980); Colligan v. Cousar, 38 Ill. App. 2d 392, 187 N.E.2d 292 (1963);
Elder v. Fisher, 247 Ind. 598, 217 N.E.2d 847 (1966); Lewis v. State, 256 N.W.2d
181 (Iowa 1977); Pike v. George, 434 S.W.2d 626 (Ky. 1968); Adamian v. Three
Sons, Inc., 353 Mass. 498, 233 N.E.2d 18 (1968); Trail v. Christian, 298 Minn. 101,
213 N.W.2d 618 (1973); Mumford, Inc. v. Peterson, 368 So.2d 213 (Miss. 1979);
Sampson v. W.F. Enterprises, Inc., 611 S.W.2d 333 (Mo. 1980); Mason v. Roberts,
33 Ohio St. 2d 29, 294 N.E.2d 884 (1973); Campbell v. Carpenter, 279 Or. 237, 566
P.2d 893 (1977); Jardine v. Upper Darby Lodge No. 1973, Inc., 413 Pa. 626, 198
A.2d 550 (1964); Mitchell v. Ketner, 54 Tenn. App. 656, 393 S.W.2d 755 (1964);
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decisions, both rendered in 1959.
In Waynick v. Chicago's Last Department Store,3 6 the plaintiff
brought a diversity action for damages suffered as the result of an automobile accident caused by a drunk driver. After first ruling that
neither Illinois nor Michigan dram shop laws applied,3 7 the Seventh
Circuit held that the plaintiffs stated a valid cause of action against the
bar owner based on common law principles of negligence.3 8 Applying
the traditional proximate cause rule to the facts at hand, the court
found the intoxicated driver to be outside the definition of "a strong
and able-bodied man" responsible for his own actions.3 9 Consequently,
it was held that any sale to a person in this condition constituted a
violation of the Illinois criminal statute prohibiting liquor sales to intoxicated persons.' Violation of this statute, coupled with the status
now granted an intoxicated person, formed the necessary proximate
cause between the sale of liquor by the tavern owner and the resulting
injuries caused by the inebriate. 4' The defendant bar owner was held
to have breached a duty to protect the public safety and was found
damages resulting from his sale of alcohol to the
liable for all ensuing
4
§
patron.
intoxicated
That same year, the New Jersey Supreme Court found a vendor
civilly liable for damages in a wrongful death suit based upon the vendor's illegal sale of alcohol to a minor. In Rappaport v. Nichols,43 the
court held that violation of a penal statute prohibiting sales of liquor to
minors or intoxicated individuals could be used as evidence of negligence. The court further maintained that sales to such persons created
a foreseeable and unreasonable risk of harm to both the customer and
the "traveling public."' This risk was believed to be further enhanced
by the increased travel by automobile and corresponding increase in
alcohol-related traffic accidents. 45 Therefore, the court held that furnishing drinks to a patron who the vendor knew or should have known
to be either underage or intoxicated constituted negligence and subjected the vendor to civil liability.4 6
Once the Waynick and Rappaport decisions had pierced through

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Callan v. O'Neil, 20 Wash. App. 32, 578 P.2d 890 (1978). These jurisdictions,
combined with those states having current dram shop acts in force, see supra note
34, comprise a vast majority of forums that recognize some form of civil liability
against liquor vendors.
269 F.2d 322 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 903 (1960).
269 F.2d at 324-25.
Id at 326.
Id at 325.
Id at 325-26.
Id at 326.
Id at 325-26.
31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959).
Id at 201-02, 156 A.2d at 8.
Id.
Id at 203-04, 156 A.2d at 10.
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the common law shield of vendor nonliability, a steady stream of jurisdictions began to adopt similar rationales.4 7 The focal point of these
judicial reinterpretations centers around the common law negligence
elements of duty and causation. 8
Modem courts now impose a duty on vendors to their customers
and the general public based upon revised perceptions of foreseeability
and judicial expansion of state penal statutes.4 9 These courts readily
concede that it is reasonably foreseeable to a tavern owner that if he
sells an obviously incapacitated person a drink, that person can ultimately cause injury to a third party by reason of his impaired condition.5 0 The "reasonable man" test by which the vendor is judged takes
into account drunk-driving statistics to determine the degree of vendor
foreseeability. 5 1 The imposition of a standard of care is deemed justified by these courts, given the potential danger of the automobile, and
concurrently, society's proclivity to drink and drive.52 Such a duty has
been found to exist apart from statutory provisions, under the rationale
that "the first prime requisite to de-intoxicate one who has, because of
alcohol, lost control over his reflexes, judgment and sense of responsibility to others, is to stop pouring alcohol into him. This is a duty which
everyone owes to society and to law entirely apart from any statute. 5 3
Other courts charging tavern owners with a legal duty liberally
construe the legislative intent behind state criminal laws that prohibit
liquor sales to certain classes of persons.5 4 These courts reason that the
purpose behind these statutes reflects a concern for public and consumer safety, and have transferred the duty required of vendors by
penal statutes over to the arena of civil liability. 55 Consequently, depending upon the jurisdiction, if a bar owner breaches his duty by violating a relevant penal statute, his act may constitute either rebuttable
47. Within the next decade, a variety of jurisdictions followed the lead of Waynick
and Rappaport. Some of these courts had traditionally followed the common law
rule. See, e.g., Davis v. Shiappacosse, 155 So.2d 365 (Fla. 1963); Mitchell v. Ketner, 54 Tenn. App. 656, 393 S.W.2d 755 (1964). Other jurisdictions had previously repealed dram shop acts, but the state courts elected to follow the modem
trend and grant a cause of action based on common law negligence principles.
See, e.g., Adamian v. Three Sons, Inc., 353 Mass. 498, 233 N.E.2d 18 (1968);
Ramsay v. Anctil, 106 N.H. 375, 211 A.2d 900 (1965).
48. See generally Annot., 98 A.L.R.3d 1230 (1980); Annot., 97 A.L.R.3d 528 (1980).
49. See, e.g., Thaut v. Finley, 50 Mich App. 611, 213 N.W.2d 820 (1973); Berkeley v.
Park, 47 Misc. 2d 381, 262 N.Y.S.2d 290 (1965).
50. See Ono v. Applegate, 612 P.2d 533, 540-41 (Hawaii 1980); Adamian v. Three
Sons, Inc., 353 Mass. 498, 501, 233 N.E.2d 18, 20 (1968); Berkeley v. Park, 47
Misc. 2d 381, 262 N.Y.S.2d 290, 293 (1965).
51. See, e.g., Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 202, 156 A.2d 1, 8-9 (1959).
52. See Deeds v. United States, 306 F. Supp. 348, 358 (D. Mont. 1969); Berkeley v.
Park, 47 Misc. 2d 381, 262 N.Y.S.2d 290, 293 (1965).
53. Jardine v. Upper Darby Lodge No. 1973, Inc., 413 Pa. 626, 629, 198 A.2d 550, 553
(1964).
54. See, e.g., Elder v. Fisher, 247 Ind. 598, 603, 217 N.E.2d 847, 851 (1966).
55. See, e.g., Adamian v. Three Sons, Inc., 353 Mass. 498, 233 N.E.2d 18 (1968); Jardine v. Upper Darby Lodge No. 1973, Inc., 413 Pa. 626, 198 A.2d 550 (1964).
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negligence 56 or negligence per se. 7
A similar transformation has occurred in the traditional concepts
of proximate cause. Today, the predominant view is that the vendor's
sale of alcohol to the customer, rather than consumption of the drink
by the patron, is the proximate cause of any foreseeable subsequent
harm.5 8 Because the potentiality of hazardous conduct is foreseeable,
the ensuing acts of an inebriate no longer serve as a superseding cause
relieving the liquor supplier of civil liability.5 9 In support of this line of
reasoning, a number of judges rely upon analogies to parallel areas of
tort law, 6° or upon the Restatement (Second) of Torts. 61 Nevertheless,
jurisdictions that apply more stringent standards than mere proximate
cause require the tavern owner's negligence to be wanton and reckless
before liability can be imposed.6 2
D. Modern Adherence to Common Law Principles
Despite the recent exodus of courts from traditional principles of
nonliability for tavern owners, a few jurisdictions, including Maryland,
continue to adhere to the common law rule. 63 Apart from established
56. See, e.g., Anslinger v. Martinsville Inn, Inc., 121 N.J. Super. 525, 298 A.2d 84
(1972).
57. See, e.g., Mason v. Roberts, 35 Ohio App. 2d 29, 300 N.E.2d 211 (1971); Majors v.
Brodhead Hotel, 416 Pa. 265, 205 A.2d 873 (1965).
58. See, e.g., Lewis v. State, 256 N.W.2d 181, 191-92 (Iowa 1977); Trail v. Christian,
298 Minn. 101, 113, 213 N.W.2d 618, 625 (1973). For support of the view that
sales, rather than consumption of alcoholic beverages are seen by a majority of
modem jurisdictions to be the proximate cause of injuries, see Vance v. United
States, 355 F. Supp. 756, 761 (D. Alaska 1973).
59. See, e.g., Deeds v. United States, 306 F. Supp. 348, 363 (D. Mont. 1969).
60. See, e.g., Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 200, 156 A.2d 1, 7 (1959). The cases
and writings dealing with the tort-feasor's intervening act following consumption
of alcohol have drawn upon those cases finding negligence on the part of suppliers
of dangerous items to incapacitated persons for support in finding negligence and
proximate cause in liquor vendor cases. See, e.g., id; Johnson, Drunken Driving
- The Civil Responsibilityof the Purveyor of IntoxicatingLiquor, 37 IND. L.J. 317,
323-25 (1962).
61. See, e.g., Lewis v. State, 256 N.W.2d 181, 188 (Iowa 1977); Deeds v. United
States, 306 F. Supp. 348, 363 (D. Mont. 1969); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS §§ 442-44 (1965).
62. See, e.g., Grasser v. Fleming, 74 Mich. App. 338, 345, 350, 253 N.W.2d 757, 760,
763 (1977).
63. Lewis v. Wolf, 122 Ariz. 567, 596 P.2d 705 (1979); Carr v. Turner, 238 Ark. 889,
385 S.W.2d 656 (1965); Wright v. Moffit, 437 A.2d 554 (Del. 1981); Holmes v.
Circo, 196 Neb. 496, 244 N.W.2d 65 (1976); Hamm v. Carson City Nugget, Inc.,
85 Nev. 99, 450 P.2d 358 (1969); Marchiondo v. Roper, 90 N.M. 367, 563 P.2d
1160 (1977). The common law doctrine had been judicially abrogated in California in Vesley v. Sager, 5 Cal. 3d 153, 486 P.2d 151, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1971), but
was subsequently reinstated by legislative enactment. See CAL. Bus. & PROF.
CODE § 25602 (West Supp. 1982). For the circumstances behind this legislative
change, see Gonzales v. United States, 589 F.2d 465, 468 (9th Cir. 1979).
Several jurisdictions, which currently have viable dram shop laws, have refused to extend to injured parties a common law cause of action for negligence.
Phillips v. Derrick, 36 Ala. App. 244, 54 So.2d 320 (1951); Nelson v. Steffens, 170
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principles, these courts offer a number of practical considerations in
support of their continued allegience to the common law doctrine.
Commonly cited obstacles to granting a new cause of action include the
difficulty in equitably apportioning civil liability between the drunk
tort-feasor and the bar owner, practical problems in the administration
of vendor liability, and the impracticality of imposing a duty upon vendors to recognize when a consumer is intoxicated.'
Certain minority jurisdictions also view the imposition of civil liability as a public policy issue within the sole responsibility of the state
legislature.6 5 Courts advancing this argument point to the absence of
dram shop statutes as evidence of positive legislative intent to refrain
from creating vendor liability.6 6 These courts fear that if they impose
civil liability upon tavern owners it would adversely increase tavern
owners' insurance CoStS, 67 open the door to similar penalties for social
hosts, 68 or encourage collusive and fraudulent suits. 69 Nevertheless,
several courts that currently espouse the minority view have expressed
their dissatisfaction with the common law rule and have indicated their
desire that the legislature promptly act to statutorily change it.7 °

64.

65.

66.
67.
68.

69.
70.

Conn. 356, 365 A.2d 1174 (1976); Keaton v. Kroger Co., 143 Ga. App. 23, 237
S.E.2d 443 (1977); Miller v. Moran, 96 IUI. App. 3d 596, 421 N.E.2d 1046 (1981);
Edgar v. Kajet, 84 Misc. 2d 100, 375 N.Y.S.2d 548 (1975); Griffen v. Sebek, 245
N.W.2d 481 (S.D. 1976); Olsen v. Copeland, 90 Wis. 2d 483, 280 N.W.2d 178
(1979); Parsons v. Jow, 480 P.2d 396 (Wyo. 1971).
See Olsen v. Copeland, 90 Wis. 2d 483, 280 N.W.2d 178 (1979). Practical difficulties frequently cited by these courts are: problems in identifying when an individual is intoxicated; predicting his future conduct; and determining which tavern
owner is liable when the drunk tort-feasor has gone "bar-hopping." Id. at 488-94,
280 N.W.2d at 180-83; see also Holmes v. Circo, 196 Neb. 496, 505, 244 N.W.2d
65, 70 (1976).
Holmes v. Circo, 196 Neb. 496, 244 N.W.2d 65 (1976); see also Carr v. Turner, 238
Ark. 889, 385 S.W.2d 656 (1965); Miller v. Moran, 96 Ill. App. 3d 596, 421 N.E.2d
1046 (1981); Hamm v. Carson City Nugget, Inc., 85 Nev. 99, 450 P.2d 358 (1969);
Olsen v. Copeland, 90 Wis. 2d 483, 280 N.W.2d 178 (1979); Parsons v. Jow, 480
P.2d 396 (Wyo. 1971).
See, e.g., Holmes v. Circo, 196 Neb. 496, 505, 244 N.W.2d 65, 70 (1976); Parsons
v. Jow, 480 P.2d 396, 397-98 (Wyo. 1971).
Olsen v. Copeland, 90 Wis. 2d 483, 493, 280 N.W.2d 178, 182 (1979).
Alsup v. Garvin-Wienke, Inc., 579 F.2d 461, 464 (8th Cir. 1978); Carr v. Turner,
238 Ark. 889, 892, 385 S.W.2d 656, 658 (1965); Holmes v. Circo, 196 Neb. 496,
504, 244 N.W.2d 65, 70 (1976). Civil liability for social hosts, as opposed to commercial vendors, is beyond the scope of this comment. Interested readers should
see Comment, Tort Liabilityfor Suppliers ofAlcohol, 44 Mo. L. REv. 757, 768-71
(1979).
Olsen v. Copeland, 90 Wis. 2d 483, 490-91, 280 N.W.2d 178, 181 (1979).
Lewis v. Wolf, 122 Ariz. 567, 572, 596 P.2d 705, 710 (1979); Marchiondo v. Roper,
90 N.M. 367, 369, 563 P.2d 1160, 1161-62 (1977). The Marchiondo court went so
far as to warn the legislature that it would hold differently when next presented
with the issue of vendor liability should the legislature fail to take corrective action. See id at 370, 563 P.2d at 1162.
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VENDOR LIABILITY IN MARYLAND

There is a dearth of Maryland case law addressing the issue of
tavern owner liability to injured third parties. Those few cases that do
confront this subject adhere to the common law rule that a vendor is
not liable for the tortious conduct of his patrons. The earliest reference
to this question is found in the case of Emerson v. Taylor.71 Although
this case concerned an action for loss of consortium caused by the defendant's negligent operation of an elevator, the Court of Appeals of
Maryland did acknowledge, in dictum, the existence of similar third
party claims based on the sale of liquor to spouses.7 2 Nevertheless, it
was not until 1951 that the Maryland court squarely addressed the issue
of vendor liability for a drunken customer's acts.
State v. Hafeld73 involved a wrongful death action brought by the
State for the widow and estate of a driver killed in a car accident. The
collision was caused by a drunk minor who had been illegally served
alcoholic beverages by the defendant tavern owner.7 4 The vendor filed
a demurrer, claiming that the customer's act of drinking the alcohol,
not the sale of it, formed the proximate cause of the ensuing accident.
The lower court sustained the defendant's demurrer and the court of
appeals affirmed.75 The court recognized that other jurisdictions had
enacted dram shop laws, and emphasized that the Maryland legislature
had never passed such a statute.76 The establishment of civil liability
upon vendors for tortious acts by patrons was considered a legislative
prerogative, hence the court interpreted the failure to enact legislation
as a positive expression by the General Assembly of their intent to continue vendor nonliability. 77 The Hatfield court refused to grant the
plaintiff a cause of action, fearing that to do so would represent an
unauthorized encroachment on the authority of state lawmakers.7 1 Instead, the court disposed of the issue by adopting the common law approach to proximate cause and standard of care, stating that "human
beings, drunk or sober, are responsible for their own torts. The law
(apart from statute) recognizes no relation of proximate cause between
a sale of liquor and a tort committed by a buyer who has drunk the
71.
72.
73.
74.

75.
76.
77.
78.

133 Md. 192, 104 A. 538 (1918).
Id at 195-96, 104 A. at 539.
197 Md. 249, 78 A.2d 754 (1951).
Id at 251, 78 A.2d at 754-55. The defendants owned and operated a tavern, the
Valley Inn, in Baltimore County which was alleged to be "remote from settlements and only accessible to persons operating automobiles." The drunk driver
causing the accident which resulted in this suit was a minor who was served in
violation of a penal statute. Id.at 250-51, 78 A.2d at 754-55. Despite the patron's
age, the court failed to find any problem in utilizing the "able-bodied man" theory
in reaching its decision.
Id. at 251-52, 78 A.2d at 755.
Id. at 253-54, 78 A.2d at 756.
Id at 256, 78 A.2d at 757.
Id.
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liquor."7' 9
In the second and most recent Maryland case to decide this issue,
the court of appeals reiterated its prior holding, despite the national
trend to the contrary. In Felder v. Butler,8 o the appellants brought a
negligence action against a tavern owner for damages incurred in a car
accident caused by an intoxicated patron.8" The appellants' claim
rested upon the dual theories of common law negligence and violation
of a statute as evidence of negligence.8 2 However, Chief Judge Murphy, writing for the majority, declined to depart from the common law
and refused to grant injured third parties a cause of action against tavern owners.
The Felder court acknowledged the evolution of vendor liability
that had occurred since the Hafeld decision and examined both its
scope and rationale.8 3 The court also took note of Maryland penal statutes that impose criminal sanctions on vendors who sell liquor to minors or intoxicated persons. 84 Although the court recognized the
gravity of the problem posed by drunk driving and the adaptability of
the common law to meet societal needs, the majority reiterated its reluctance to judicially create a new cause of action. 85 Ignoring issues of
proximate cause and standard of care, the Fe/der court labeled the issue
of vendor liability a "public policy" matter and voiced the same fear of
judicial intermeddling in legislative affairs as had been raised thirty
years previously in the Hafeld decision.8 6 The court concluded by
noting that the legislature may wish to reconsider the lack of any statutory provision for a cause of action against vendors and implied that
future cases on this issue might meet with a different outcome.8 7
In her dissent, Judge Davidson found that legislative inaction was
a dubious basis upon which to draw the affirmative conclusions formed
79. Id at 254, 78 A.2d at 756.
80. 292 Md. 174, 438 A.2d 494 (1981). The only intervening reference to the issue of
tavern owner liability which occurred between the Hatfield and Felder decisions
was a brief acknowledgment, in dictum, of the common law doctrine. Walker v.
Hall, 34 Md. App. 571, 584, 369 A.2d 105, 113 (1977).
81. Felder v. Butler, 292 Md. 174, 176-77, 438 A.2d 494, 495 (1981). The patron who
was the drunken tort-feasor in this case was a woman. Id at 175-76, 438 A.2d at
495. Thus, the Maryland court has held that liquor sales to underaged patrons
(Hagfield)and to female customers (Felder) meet the common law prerequisite of
a sale to an "able-bodied man." See supra note 5.
82. Brief for Appellant at 9-25, Felder v. Butler, 292 Md. 174, 438 A.2d 494 (1981).
83. Felder v. Butler, 292 Md. 174, 178-81, 438 A.2d 494, 496-98 (1981).
84. Id at 181, 438 A.2d at 498. See infra note 125 for a discussion of these Maryland
statutes.
85. Felder v. Butler, 292 Md. 174, 182, 438 A.2d 494, 499 (1981).
86. Id at 183-84, 438 A.2d at 499-500.
87. Id at 184, 438 A.2d at 499. In concluding its decision, the court inferred that
judgment in future suits of this nature would not depend upon legislative action,
saying: "[tiherefore, since the legislature has not yet created dram shop liability
by statute, we declinefor now, to join the new trend of cases. . . . Nevertheless,
the legislature may wish to consider re-examining the Hatfield rule ...
" Id
(emphasis added).

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 12

by the majority. According to Judge Davidson, mere inaction by the
state's lawmakers to create dram shop statutes does not rise to the level
of a declaration of state public policy."8 With the alarming increases in
drunk-driving injuries and the changing conditions within society, the
dissenting judge remained unconvinced that the common law rule was
89
capable of providing fair and effective solutions to the problem.
Rather, the dissent argued that a civil cause of action should be granted
against vendors for injuries caused by patrons to whom they sell liquor
in violation of existing Maryland penal statutes. 90
IV.

ANALYSIS
The Hafield decision, rendered thirty years ago, adequately reflected the tenor of existing legal thought on the issue of vendor liability. The present holding in the Felder case, however, represents an
anachronism currently shared by only a handful of jurisdictions nationwide. 9 While relying upon the legislature's inertia as an indication
of its positive intent, the court abstained from taking affirmative steps
to effect a valid judicial change. The Felder court's reluctance to shape
needed reform overlooks both the availability of viable, alternative
courses of action and the court's own prior treatment of related issues
within the area of Maryland tort law.
A.

Common Law Groundsfor Modifying the Rule of Vendor
Nonliabilitfy
A cause of action in negligence has traditionally encompassed four
elements: (1) a duty imposed on the defendant to conform to a certain
standard of care; (2) breach of this duty; (3) proximate cause - a
causal connection between the breach of duty and the injury; and
(4) an actual loss or damage resulting to another.9 2 The rule of nonliability adopted in Ha6feld, and reaffirmed in Felder, can be viewed as
the product of traditional judicial perceptions of duty and proximate
cause, formulated to satisfy the needs of an earlier era. However, an
assessment of the elements of negligence, in light of modern
knowledge, reveals adequate grounds for allowing injured parties a
cause of action against tavern owners.
For liability in negligence to attach to the defendant he must be
obligated to the plaintiff to conduct himself in accordance with a le88.
89.
90.
91.

Id at 185-86, 438 A.2d at 500 (Davidson, J., dissenting).
Id at 186, 438 A.2d at 500.
Id at 186, 438 A.2d at 500-01.
See supra note 63. The Felder court concedes that a shift in modem judicial approaches to vendor liability has occurred and refers to this change as the "new

trend of cases." Felder v. Butler, 292 Md. 174, 178, 438 A.2d 494, 496 (1981).
92. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 30 (4th ed. 1971); see also Read Drug &
Chemical Co. v. Colwill Constr. Co., 250 Md. 406, 412, 243 A.2d 548, 553 (1968);
Walter Brooks Bradley, Inc. v. Yates & Co., 218 Md. 263, 268, 146 A.2d 433, 436
(1958).
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gaily recognized standard of care. 93 The standard imposed upon the
defendant is generally that of a reasonable person under similar circumstances. 9a Moreover, the test of a reasonable person may be expanded to include the experience of the individual defendant, as well as
the knowledge possessed by the average person. 95 Given the prevalence and publicity of the death and damage caused by drunk drivers,
it is hard to imagine that a tavern owner could be unaware of the dangers of serving alcoholic beverages to youthful or obviously intoxicated
patrons. Imposition of a duty upon tavern owners would require that
they refrain from selling liquor to those particular individuals who, by
common experience or knowledge, the tavern owner knows or should
know are likely to represent an unreasonable risk of harm to others. 96
Vendors ignoring these risks, by making sales to incapacitated customers, may reasonably be found to have breached a standard of care owed
to members of the general public.97
Questions of proximate cause depend, in part, upon whether the
resulting injury was of a type that is foreseeable to an ordinary, prudent
person acting under the same circumstances as those encountered by
the defendant. 98 Whether a defendant liquor vendor could have anticipated subsequent injury to third parties may be determined in light of
the frequency with which such injuries occur. In more than ninety percent of the cases of death by automobile collision in Maryland, when
fault could be ascertained, a drinking driver was involved. 99 Approximately one million serious injuries sustained in car accidents nationwide are the result of intoxicated drivers, at a cost of more than five
billion dollars annually."l
The dimensions of these statistics would
seem to confirm the reasonable probability, capable of being anticipated by vendors, that subsequent harm will result from sales to minors
or drunk patrons. It is not necessary that the exact manner in which
injury was caused be foreseeable, only that the resulting damage occur
within "a general field of danger which should have been antici93. See Social Security Admin. Baltimore F.C.U. v. United States, 138 F. Supp. 639,
645 (D. Md. 1956).
94. See Lindenberg v. Needles, 203 Md. 8, 15-16, 97 A.2d 901, 904 (1953).
95. Johnson v. County Arena, Inc., 29 Md. App. 674, 678-80, 349 A.2d 643, 645-46
(1976).
96. While the general standard of care does not vary, a court may consider relevant
circumstances, including the defendant's superior ability and experience acquired
by his occupation, to determine if he acted as a reasonable person with similar
attributes. See Holler v. Lowery, 175 Md. 149, 157-58, 200 A.2d 353, 357 (1938);
Johnson v. County Arena, Inc., 29 Md. App. 674, 678-80, 349 A.2d 643, 645-46
(1976).
97. See, e.g., Jardine v. Upper Darby Lodge No. 1973, Inc., 413 Pa. 626, 629, 198
A.2d 550, 553 (1964).
98. Campbell v. State, 203 Md. 338, 346, 100 A.2d 798, 802 (1953); City of Baltimore
v. Terio, 147 Md. 330, 336, 128 A. 353, 355 (1925).
99. Md. Dep't of Transp., Report of the Task Force on the Drinking Driver 3 (1980)
(available from Md. Dep't of Transp.).
100. Baltimore Sunpapers, Jan. 10, 1982, at B2, col. 2.
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pated." I°" However, the test of foreseeability does not contemplate a
standard of strict liability. Examination of the factual circumstances
surrounding the tavern owner's sale assists the court in determining the
degree of foreseeability on a case by case basis.° 2 Thus, recognition of
a negligence cause of action in vendor liability cases would merely require tavern owners to refrain from sales to individuals who a reasonably prudent person would believe to be capable of inflicting harm on
others.
Reliance upon existing principles of proximate cause in Maryland
disposes of the defense of superseding causation that may arise within
the context of determining vendor liability. When the plaintiff is injured by someone other than the defendant, the intervening act will not
release the defendant from liability if the intervention was susceptible
of being foreseen by the defendant in the natural and ordinary course
of events.' 0 3 In order to constitute a superseding cause sufficient to absolve the defendant of liability, the intervening act must alone be the
cause of the injury."° Courts have been especially unwilling to relieve
defendants who, because of their initial negligence, create the risk that
an intervening cause of the injury will occur.105
Illustrative of Maryland's judicial approach regarding issues of intervening causation are cases involving the doctrine of negligent entrustment. Essential to the foundation of a cause of action for negligent
entrustment is the recognition that certain people present dangers on
public highways by reason of their propensity to drink and drive, and
that these particular intervening acts are foreseeable. 0 6 In Rounds v.
Phillips,107 the administratrix of the estate of a driver killed in a car
accident sought to bring suit against the parents of the minor who had
caused the collision. The plaintiff contended that a cause of action
should be granted since, despite the defendant's knowledge of their
101. Segerman v. Jones, 256 Md. 109, 132, 259 A.2d 794, 805 (1969) (quoting McLeod
v. Grant County School Dist. No. 128, 42 Wash. 2d 316, 255 P.2d 360 (1953)); see
also American Laundry Mach. Indus. v. Horan, 45 Md. App. 97, 104, 412 A.2d
407, 413 (1980).
102. See generally State, Use of Weaver v. O'Brien, 140 F. Supp. 306, 311 (D. Md.
1956); Curley v. General Valet Services, 270 Md. 248, 264, 311 A.2d 231, 239
(1973); Fowler v. Smith, 240 Md. 240, 246, 213 A.2d 549, 553-54 (1965).
103. See State v. Hecht Co., 165 Md. 415, 421, 169 A. 311, 313 (1933).
104. Id; see also Suburban Trust Co. v. Waller, 44 Md. App. 335, 347, 408 A.2d 758,
766 (1979).
105. See, e.g., Scott v. Watson, 278 Md. 160, 172-73, 359 A.2d 548, 556 (1976). The
Maryland court in Scott adopted a combination of an "enhanced risk theory" and
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 448 (1965) to solve the causation problem
created by a negligent act resulting in a foreseeable third party tort. Scott v. Watson, 278 Md. 160, 172-73, 359 A.2d 548, 556 (1976); see also Little v. Woodall, 244
Md. 620, 626, 224 A.2d 852, 855 (1966).
106. For a comprehensive overview of Maryland cases applying the negligent entrustment doctrine to situations involving drivers with drunk-driving histories, see
Curley v. General Valet Services, 270 Md. 248, 311 A.2d 231 (1973).
107. 166 Md. 151, 170 A. 532 (1934).

19821

Liquor Vendor Liability

son's previous record of reckless and drunk driving, they negligently
furnished him an automobile. 0 8 Adopting the negligent entrustment
theory as law, the Court of Appeals of Maryland acknowledged a cause
of action to exist against the supplier of a potentially hazardous article
to an individual who the supplier knows, or should have known, poses
a threat to those with whom he may later come into contact.10 9 Subsequent cases continue to impose liability on defendants who provide incompetents the means of inflicting injury on others in accordance with
the Restatement (Second)of Torts expression of the rule." 0 A substantial number of negligent entrustment cases involve defendants who
provided automobiles to drivers whom they knew habitually drove
while intoxicated. I"
The disparity between the positions taken by the court of appeals
on the issues of vendor liability and negligent entrustment appears to
lack adequate justification. In both instances, the defendant supplies a
potentially hazardous article to one who is likely to use it in such a
manner as to pose a foreseeable risk of harm to innocent third parties." 2 Indeed, a stronger argument for civil liability may be made
when the tavern owner serves liquor to an obviously intoxicated patron. Unlike the negligent entrustment situation, when the article is
provided to one having a past record of incompetence, the tavern owner is able to directly observe the patron's incapacitated condition.
Under this circumstance, the foreseeability of subsequent harm caused
by the recipient of the hazardous article (the alcohol) is arguably
greater than in cases of negligent entrustment presently recognized by
Maryland courts.
B. Policy Considerationsfor Modifying the Rule of Vendor
Nonliability
Determining the proximate cause of any contested injury necessarily turns upon issues of foreseeability and intervening causation. However, as noted by the Court of Appeals of Maryland, any decision
regarding proximate cause ultimately rests upon a judicial evaluation
of "fairness or social policy as well as mere causation.""' 3 The conditions under which most torts of intoxicated patrons occur today are
vastly different from the period when the common law doctrine of nonliability for vendors developed. For example,
108. Id at 153-61, 170 A. at 532-35.
109. Id at 166-67, 170 A. at 537-38.
110. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 390 (1965). For a case applying
the RESTATEMENT rule, see Kohlenberg v. Goldstein, 290 Md. 477, 485, 431 A.2d
76, 81 (1981).
111. See, e.g., State of Maryland v. O'Brien, 140 F. Supp. 306 (D. Md. 1956); Snowhite
v. State ex rel. Tennant, 243 Md. 291, 221 A.2d 342 (1966).
112. For analogies between provision of liquor and that of other potentially hazardous
articles, see Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959).
113. Peterson v. Underwood, 258 Md. 9, 16, 264 A.2d 851, 855 (1970).
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[M]ost courts, at common law,. . . held that the provision of
alcohol was not the proximate cause of injury. Such reasoning is far more persuasive when a drunkardis annoying or
assaulting a passerby, riding a horse, or driving his carriage
through the village street at the breathtaking speed of 10 to 20
miles per hour, than when an inebriate is in incompetent control of a 2-ton metal juggernaut powered by three hundred
horsepower.' 14
Antiquated notions of proximate cause, unresponsive to the exigencies
of modern life, should not serve as a shield behind which vendors who
negligently serve minors or drunk customers can seek protection. The
Felder court, by perpetuating the common law principles enunciated in
the Ha6eld decision, provides such immunity to liquor vendors despite
an obvious need for change.
The court of appeals recognizes the dynamics of the common law
and its susceptibility to change caused by society's vascillating conditions and increasing knowledge." 5 Modification of the common law
may be effected by legislative action, judicial opinion, or by court
rules." l 6 Consequently, the court may revise or abrogate common law
principles which it finds unresponsive to the demands of modern life. 7
Since the judiciary is not bound by the doctrine of stare decisis from
taking action deemed necessary to protect fundamental rights of injured parties, the court of appeals can change the rule of vendor nonliability by exercising its authority to interpret Maryland common law."'
The Maryland judiciary has demonstrated its willingness to create
a right of action apart from existing and contrary common law, and in
spite of the General Assembly's refusal to heed the court's suggestion
for enactment of new legislation.' ' 9 For example, in Lusby v. Lusby, 120
the court of appeals permitted a cause of action for damages by one
spouse against another, despite the common law doctrine of spousal
114. Halvorson v. Birchfield Boiler, Inc., 76 Wash. 2d 759, 767, 458 P.2d 897, 901
(1969) (Finley, J., dissenting).
115. Williams v. State, 292 Md. 212, 217, 438 A.2d 1301, 1308 (1981); Lewis v. State,
285 Md. 705, 715, 404 A.2d 1073, 1078 (1979).
116. Pope v. State, 284 Md. 309, 341, 396 A.2d 1054, 1073 (1979); Moaney v. State, 28
Md. App. 408, 414, 346 A.2d 466, 471 (1975).
117. Kline v. Ansell, 287 Md. 585, 590, 414 A.2d 929, 931 (1980); Pope v. State, 284
Md. 309, 341-42, 396 A.2d 1054, 1072-73 (1979); White v. King, 244 Md. 348, 354,
223 A.2d 763, 767 (1966).
118. Pope v. State, 284 Md. 309, 342, 396 A.2d 1054, 1073 (1979); White v. King, 244
Md. 348, 354, 223 A.2d 763, 767 (1966).
In Marusa v. District of Columbia, 484 F.2d 828 (D.C. Cir. 1973), the District
of Columbia Circuit Court, after reviewing the Hafeld decision, rejected the
common law rule of nonliability. In doing so, the court stated that "judges and
scholars have generally been wary of this kind of generalization from the common
law, and with good reason. The common law is an immense and amorphous body
of doctrine." Id at 834-35.
119. See Lusby v. Lusby, 283 Md. 334, 357, 390 A.2d 77, 88 (1978).
120. 283 Md. 334, 390 A.2d 77 (1978).
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immunity from tort action. Faced with an intentional tort perpetrated
by a husband upon his wife by means of outrageous conduct, the court
readily conceded that "no sound public policy in the latter half of the
20th century" could be thought to prevent2 the wife from recovering
from her husband for his outrageous acts.1 '
The common law doctrine of vendor nonliability is a creation of
the courts and not a product of statute. The plaintiffs in the Hafield
and Felder cases were not asking the court to modify or overrule a
legislative provision, but rather to revise a judge-made doctrine. However, both decisions focused on the lack of legislation as grounds for
refusing to take action to effectuate change. In Haofleld, the court determined that the legislature's failure to enact dram shop provisions
constituted an expression of intent "as clearly and compellingly as affirmative legislation would."' 1 22 Three decades later, the Felder court
elected to adopt this same interpretation. 123 However, as Judge Davidson pointed out in her dissenting opinion in Felder, reliance by the
court on legislative nonaction provides a dubious basis for reaching
positive inferences of that body's intent.124 Such an approach appears
to be one of judicial preference, rather than a result mandated by legal
precedent.
C. Statutory Grounds/orModifying the Rule of Vendor Nonliability
While the Maryland legislature has never enacted a dram shop act,
penal statutes do exist that prohibit the sale or provision of alcoholic
beverages by commercial licensees to underage or incapacitated customers.' 2 5 Although the majority's decision in Felder does no more
than note the existence of these Maryland criminal provisions, other
jurisdictions with similar penal statutes have utilized them as catalysts
121. Id at 357, 390 A.2d at 88.
122. State v. Hatfield, 197 Md. 249, 256, 78 A.2d 754, 757 (1951).
123. Felder v. Butler, 292 Md. 174, 183-84, 438 A.2d 494, 499 (1981). In adopting this
position, the Felder court stated that "[t]he court has therefore declined to alter a
common law rule in the face of indications that to do so would be contrary to the
public policy of the State, as declaredby the General Assembly of Maryland." Id
at 183, 438 A.2d at 499 (emphasis added).
124. Id at 185, 438 A.2d at 500 (Davidson, J., dissenting).
125. MD. ANN. CODE art. 2B, § 118(a) (1981 & Supp. 1982) limits sales to individuals
by age (21 years or older for alcoholic beverages, except sales of beer and light
wine to persons 18 years of age or older) and restricts sales to customers visibly
under the influence of alcoholic beverages. MD. ANN. CODE art. 2B, § 119(a)
(1981 & Supp. 1982) prohibits sales or provision of alcoholic beverages to known
habitual drunkards, mentally deficient persons, or persons who are the subject of
a notice provided vendors as to their unsound mental, psychological, or physical
condition. Violation of either of these statutes carries with it the potential of a
misdemeanor conviction and the imposition of a fine, imprisonment, or both. See
id §§ 118(a), 119(a), 200.
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for changing the common law rule of nonliability.12 6 These courts interpret the legislative intent behind these criminal laws as indicative of
a desire to protect both the consumer and other members of the public.' 27 Hence, the vendor who violates such criminal statutes is also
found to have violated a standard of care established by the legislature. 128
Maryland statutes lend themselves to a similar judicial interpretation. By limiting licensee liability to only those sales made to customers visibly intoxicated, incapacitated, or under legal age, the Maryland
legislature specifically isolated the very classes of individuals who pos129
sess the greatest potential for causing harm to themselves or others.
The court could logically extend the duty currently placed on vendors
to refrain from such sales into the area of civil responsibility.
30
In Maryland, violation of a statute is evidence of negligence.
However, the mere violation of a statute does not support an action for
damages absent the existence of sufficient evidence to show that the
violation was the proximate cause of the injury suffered.' 3 ' Existing
criminal statutes allow a vendor, charged with making an illegal sale,
to present evidence of due caution in his defense. 132 Similar factual
considerations could also be available to negate the elements of foreseeability or proximate causation when determining the civil liability of
a vendor. 33 Thus, a jury weighing the evidence presented in an action
126. See, e.g., Pike v. George, 434 S.W.2d 626 (Ky. 1968); Trail v. Christian, 298 Minn.
101, 213 N.W.2d 618 (1973).
Both cases, in order to initiate the modem revision of common law nonliability principles, relied to a degree upon the violation of a state criminal statute to
support the finding of a cause of action in negligence. See Waynick v. Chicago's
Last Dept. Store, 269 F.2d 322, 326 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 903
(1960); Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 202, 156 A.2d 1, 8 (1959).
127. Adamian v. Three Sons, Inc., 353 Mass. 498, 500, 233 N.E.2d 18, 19 (1968); see
also Mason v. Roberts, 33 Ohio St. 2d 29, 32, 294 N.E.2d 884, 887 (1973).
128. See, e.g., Elder v. Fisher, 247 Ind. 598, 217 N.E.2d 847 (1966); Thaut v. Finley, 50
Mich. App. 611, 213 N.W.2d 820 (1973); Berkeley v. Park, 47 Misc. 2d 381, 262
N.Y.S.2d 290 (1965).
129. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 2B, § 118(a) (1981 & Supp. 1982). The Maryland criminal provision for sales to drunkards or persons mentally, psychologically, or
physically impaired requires that such sales are not actionable unless made
"knowingly." The statute's definition of "knowingly" closely approximates the
usual standard imposed in common law negligence elements: "The word "knowingly," as to habitual drunkards should be construed to mean such knowledge as a
reasonable man would have under ordinary circumstances, from the habits, appearances or personal reputation of such individual." Id § 119(a).
130. McLhinney v. Lansdell Corp., 254 Md. 7, 254 A.2d 177 (1969); Austin v.
Buettmer, 211 Md. 61, 124 A.2d 793 (1956).
131. Aron & Co. v. Service Transp. Co., 486 F. Supp. 1070 (D. Md. 1980); Dean v.
Redmiles, 280 Md. 137, 374 A.2d 329 (1977); Peterson v. Underwood, 258 Md. 9,
264 A.2d 851 (1970).
132. MD. ANN. CODE art. 2B, § 118(a) (1981 & Supp. 1982).
133. See People v. Johnson, 81 Cal. App. 2d 973, 975, 185 P.2d 105, 106 (1947). The
court, in construing a criminal statute similar to Maryland's provision, stated:
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for civil damages against a tavern owner would reach its determination
in a manner very much the same as is done for current criminal violations. Ultimately, a finding of negligence based on a statutory violation
is within the province of a jury. 34 However, the court of appeals refuses to even grant a cause of action for the civil liability of vendors,
thus removing the determination of negligence from the jury and automatically immunizing tavern owners from civil liability.'3 5
V.

CONCLUSION

Although the Felder court felt constrained by what it perceived to
be the declared public policy of the state legislature, the Court of Appeals of Maryland was not left without the means to recognize a civil
cause of action against tavern owners. Revised interpretations of proximate cause and legal duties of vendors initiated in the majority of jurisdictions are acceptable platforms from which to launch judicial
change. Additional support for creating a cause of action can be found
through existing penal statutes, the violation of which is considered evidence of negligence. By granting injured third parties a right of action
against tavern owners, legislative action is not impinged, stare decisis
principles are not ignored, and parties injured by the negligent acts of
bar patrons are permitted an opportunity to convince a jury of the merits of their claim. The end result will force tavern owners to bear responsibility for their actions and lead to a decrease in the already
unacceptably high incidence of deaths and injuries caused by drunk
drivers.
James P. O 'Meara

It seems clear, therefore, that a duty is placed upon the seller before
serving the intended purchaser to use his powers of observation to such
an extent as to see that which is easily seen and to hear that which is
easily heard, under the conditions and circumstances then and there existing. On the other hand, it is equally clear that he is not required to
subject the customer to tests which would disclose symptoms not readily
apparent to anyone having normal powers of observation-sight, hearing, and possibly smell.
Id
134. See Mayor and City Council v. Seidel, 44 Md. App. 465, 471-74, 409 A.2d 747,
750-51 (1980).
135. Judge Davidson, in her dissent in Felder, would grant a cause of action based
upon violation of the provisions contained in MD. ANN. CODE art. 2B, § 118(a)
(1981 & Supp. 1982). Felder v. Butler, 292 Md. 174, 186, 438 A.2d 494, 500-01
(1981) (Davidson, J., dissenting).

